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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VERNAL K. FRONK,

Appellant,
-vs.STATE OF UTAH in the interest
of VERNAL FLOYD FRONK,
RICKY DEAN F R 0 N K, and
CINDY LEE FRONK,
Respondents.
No. 8734
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Juvenile
Court of the First District made June 10, 1957, depriving the parents of their three minor children. The matter
was referred to the Juvenile Court after the conclusion
of a divorce action between Betty :Mae Fronk and Vernal
K. Fronk in the District Court of Weber County. The
action was referred to the Juvenile Court pursuant to
Sec. 55-10-5( 4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, for determination or recommendation concerning the custody of the
children and to determine whether or not the parents
should be permanently re.strained from visiting the chil-
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dren and the children released for adoption. The Juvenile Court on its own motion took judicial notice of the
divorce c.ase of Betty Mae Fronk, Plaintiff, vs. Vernal
K. Fronk, Defendant, Civil No. 31760, in the District
Court of Weber County, although the Juvenile Court
had no reporter's transcript of the proceeding in the
divorce case. Such judicial notice was confined to the
pleadings, findings and decree, (R.2). The hearing from
which this .Appeal is taken was held before the Juvenile
Court on June 10, 1957. The Appellant is the father of
the three minor children concerned. At the time of the
hearing, the three minor children were in a foster home
under the supervision of the '\Veber County Department
of Public Welfare.

,,In:

l\1:r. Kent Leveridge, the Child Welfare Representative of the Weber County Deparhnent of Public \Velfare,
testified before the Court and stated that his Department
found that they had not yet had sufficient time to properly evaluate the ability of the parents to care for the
children, (R. 4, 5, 7, 11). :Jir. Leveridge offered no testimony concerning the Appellant or his fitness to be
awarded the custody of his children.

~w:

The only testin1ony in opposition to Appellant's
fitness to be awarded the custody of his children came
fr01n his former wife and his n1other-in-law. His exwife stated that Appellant ·went out with girls or worked
on cars, (R. 16). She also stated that during the period
prior to the divorce trial he followed her to .a beer tavern
with a can1era, (R. 1-1). The only co1n1nent concerning
2
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Appellant made by Mrs. Gorder, his mother-in-law,
was that he was away from the children for about two
years while he was in the Army, (R. 24). Appellant and
his witnesses were not in the Court during the time that
testimony had been given by Betty Fronk .and her witnesses. They had been waiting in the Juvenile Court
on the 8th floor of the Municipal Building and had not
been advised that the hearing was being conducted in
Judge vVahlquist's Courtroom on the 5th floor, (R. 28,
30, 31).
Following testimony relative to the fitness of the
mother, the Court heard Appellant and the witnesses on
his behalf. Appellant testified he was employed by the
Ogden Iron Works in Ogden .as an electrician and that
he earned $1.95 per hour, (R. 31). Appellant also said
that he had made arrangements with his aunt, who had
a three-bedroom home in Ogden, to care for the children
in her home. Appellant stated that he could also reside
in her home so that he could be with the children when
he was not working, (R. 32). He indicated that he would
make an effort to provide a good home for the children
and would be willing to work under the direct supervision of the Weber County Department of Public W elfare, (R.34). This was confirmed by Mrs. Pearl Jenna,
Appellant's aunt, who testified that she had a comfortable
three-bedroom home with adequate room to provide a
good home for the children, that she was not employed
and was able to devote her full time to their care. She
also stated that there was room for Appellant to reside in
her home, ( R. 46).

3
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Other witnesses testifying on behalf of the Appellant
were G. Albert Wimmer, Bishop of the L.D.S. Ward in
which Appellant and his family were members. Bishop
Wimmer testified regarding the favorable conditions in
the Fronk home .and Appellant's regular church attendance, (R. 38, 39). Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Pledger, a couple
who had been acquainted with the Fronk family for
many years, testified concerning home conditions of the
Fronk family and the regular attendance of the family
in the Church, (R. 41, 44).
During the course of the hearing on June 10, 1957,
the Juvenile Court made several references to the fact
that the custody of the children had been before it on
September 7, 1956 and November 19, 1956, (R. 28, 29).
Those hearings were not made a part of this Appeal because both of those hearings were devoted to an investigation of alleged misconduct on the part of the mother
of the children who is not a party to this Appeal.
After the testi1nony of all of the witnesses had been
heard, the matter was subnritted to the Court. The Court
immediately rendered a decision upon the matter, stating
that it was reluctant to place the children for adoption
but felt that it \Yas the only course open. The Court
further stated that under no circmnstances would it
consider returning the children to the father, (R. 49).
The Order was then 1nade that the children be placed
in the en~tody of the Deparhnent of Public \Yelfare for
the purpose of placing the children for adoption. The
foregoing Order was 1nade by the Court on June 10, 1957,
the date of the hearing, (R. 49). The Findings of Fact
4
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and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree and Judgment of
the Juvenile Court were later filed on the 3rd day of
July, 1957.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF
HIS MINOR CHILDREN, OR THAT HE SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY DEPRIVED OF HIS .CHILDREN, AND THAT
THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION.
POINT II.
ASSUMING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE COURT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE CHILDREN IN THE .CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WELFARE, IT WAS A GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE OOURT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS MINOR
CHILDREN AND ORDER THEM TO BE PLACED FOR
ADOPTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF
HIS MINOR CHILDREN, OR THAT HE SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY DEPRIVED OF HIS .CHILDREN, AND THAT
THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION.

It is a universally established principle of common
law that a parent's right to the custody and control of
his minor children is a sacred right and a right with which

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Court should not interfere except where by conduct
the parent forfeits that right. The common law also
strongly favors the maintenance of natural parent-child
relations as an element of great advantage to the child
when the question of custody of a child is to be determined.
"As long as parents properly exercise their duty,
under their natural rights to rear, educate, and control
their children, their right to do so may not be interfered with solely because some other person or some
other institution might be better deemed for that purpose." 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 21, p. 794.
However, in ca.ses where a parent fails to provide
his children with the care to which such minor children
are entitled, the proper courts, both at common law and
under our statutes, may remove those children from the
custody of the parents and place them in the care of a
proper person.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
and applied the rule of law that "where the parent is
a ri:wrally fit person to have the care and custody of his
own offspring, his rights are paran1ount to the rights
of all others." See Alley v. Alley, 67 Utah 316, 247 P.
301, 304; and State c. Sorensen, 102 etah ±7±, 132 P.2d
132, 134.
This Court has also recognized the rule to be that
there is a legal presun1ption that it is for the best interests of the ehild and of society for the child to remain
with its natural parents during the period of its minority

6
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and be maintained, cared for, and educated by them ,and
under their supervision and direction. Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah 373, 134 P. 898, 901; State v. Sorensen,
supra.

The following rules have been laid down by the Utah
Supreme Court in regard to the evidence necessary to
support a decision depriving a parent of his minor
children:

1. On any fact necessary to support a decision to
deprive a parent of it.s child, the court must be first
convinced of such fact by a preponderance of the evidence on such question, and the burden of persuading
the court is never on the parent. In re Bradley, 109 Utah
538, 167 p .2d 978, 984.
2. "The unfitness which will deprive a parent of the
right to the custody of the child must be positive and
not merely comparative, or merely speculative." Cooke
v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 108; State v. Sorensen,
supra.

Appellant's first point then raise.s this question:
Was the evidence produced at the Juvenile Court hear.ing of such character and of such weight to overcome
the presumption of appellant's fitness to have the custody
of his children and to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that appellant was not a fit and proper
person to raise his

children~

An examination of the evidence of appellant's conduct that could be construed as detrimental to his claim

7
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to the custody of his children shows only the following
acts on his part :
.·_

1. Prior to the divorce trial he took photographs
of his wife while she was in a tavern and as a re_sult
of this there was some disturbance caused at the tavern,
(R.14).

2. His divorced wife felt that he couldn't give the
children a good home because "he has been going out with
girls," and "he would be running around or else working on cars," ( R. 16).
3. The only complaint his mother-in-law, Mrs. Gorder, made concerning him was that he had been away from
the children for two years while he was in the military
service, (R. 24).
4. The Child Welfare representative of the Weber
County Department of Public Welfare testified that his
dep:artment had not had sufficient time to make any
recommendations concerning the fitness of the parents
to retain the custody of the children. This witness offered
no testimony that in any way indicated that appellant
was unfit to care for his minor children, (R. 4, 5, 7, and
11).
The only other evidence that was in any way detrimental to appellant'.s position came from the Findings
of the District Court in the divorce action. These findings indicated that appellant was not presently a fit and
proper person to be awarded the custody of his children
because "he had not been sho\\Tn to be law abiding, honest

8
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or understanding of the children's needs or welfare,"
and further that he had been convicted of a felony by a
United States Military Court.
Certainly the evidence before the Juvenile Court
concerning appellant's conduct was not of .such a positive
nature as to establish by a preponderance of the evi·
dence that appellant should be permanently deprived of
his minor children. The only remaining ground upon
which the Juvenile Court's action could be justified then
is the finding that appellant was convicted of a felony
by aU. S. Military Court.
The question then raised is this: Does the conviction
of a felony, per se, require that the Juvenile Court permanently deprive appellant of his children~
This question has twice been before the California
appellate courts, and in both cases the court ruled that
a felony conviction, standing alone, was not sufficient
cause to deprive a parent of custody of his children.
See In re Case's Guardianship, 57 Calif. Ap. 2d 844, 135
P. 2d 681, 683. The court in discussing this question
said:
"Appellant contends that she was denied the
privilege of cross examining Petitioner for the
purpose of showing that petitioner was in a naval
prison at the time that the maternal grandmother
wa.s appointed guardian of the minor. Upon a
trial of the character and fitness of the father
to have the custody of his child, a misdeed which
may have occurred many years prior to the hearing is too remote to prove present unworthiness.
9
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Serving a term in prison is not per se cause for
depriving a parent of the ~custody of his child. The
commis.sion of mala prohibita which may result
in penal servitude is not conclusive proof of vicious character."
Also in a very recent case the California court again
affirmed the same principle. See In re Minniear's Estate,
141 Calif. Ap. 2d 703, 297 P. 2d 105, 108, where the
Court said:
"Appellant is right in saying that the time at
which fitness may be judged is the present and
not the past; that the mere fact that a parent has
been convicted of a crime and has served a prison
term is not an automatic bar to the award of
custody."
is

In 67 O.J.S., Sec. 12, at page 659, the following rule
out:
"In order to establish unfitness it must be
shown that provision for the child's ordinary
comfort or intellectual and moral development
cannot reasonably be expected at the parent's
hand."

se~t

We submit that a consideration of all the evidence
before the Juvenile Court fails to establish the unfitness
of the appellant. On the contrary, the evidence show::;
that appellant has steady employment in his trade, has
sufficient earnings to properly support his children,
(R. 31), has made real progre.ss in rehabilitating himself since his release fr01n n1ilitary detention, and has
the n1eans and facilities to provide adequately for the
ordinary c01nfort, education and n1oral develop1nent of
his 1ninor children, (R. 32).

10
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POINT II.
ASSUMING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE COURT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE CHILDREN IN THE ·CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WELFARE, IT WAS A GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE OOURT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS MINOR
CHILDREN AND ORDER 'THEM TO BE PLACED FOR
ADOPTION.

The statutory provisions which concern the matter
of depriving parents of the custody of their children do
not mention permanently depriving the parents of such
custody, nor do they set down any standards of conduct
which constitute a justification for an order permanently
depriving the parents of their children, Sec. 55-10-32
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This court has previously had before it the question of what conduct
is sufficient justification to permanently deprive a parent of .a minor child in the case of In re Bradley, 109 Utah
538, 167 P.2d 978. Barbara Bradley was the mother of
an illegitimate child. The evidence showed repeated a-cts
of immorality on her part, that she became infected with
a venereal disea.se as a result of such conduct, that she
had neglected and abandoned her minor child, and that
she was married to a person who had previously been
convicted of a felony and had served time in prison.
After consideration of the evidence of her conduct, the
Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Juvenile
Court awarding the custody of her minor child to other
persons, but significantly declined to permanently bar
11
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her from regaining the custody of her child, saying, at
page 985:
"This does not mean that Barbara will be
forever barred from obtaining the custody of her
baby, .and the custody of the child may be changed
when justified by the surrounding facts and circumstances."
The case of State v. Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132 P.
2d 132, was .a case wherein Fern Jensen, the natural
father of a minor child, wa_s deprived of the custody
of his child because of his neglect and the further fact
that he had kept the child, a girl, in an unwholesome environment by drinking, carousing, cursing, and swearing
in the presence of the child. Sometime after being deprived of his child by the Juvenile Court, Jensen filed
a petition to regain custody of the child on the basis
that he had remarried, and that his home conditions were
now sufficiently unproved to adequately provide for the
child. The Juvenile Court made an order to the effect
that if Fern Jensen conducted hin1self "becomingly" for
a period of ten months from the date of the order, he
would be allowed to regain the custody of his child.
Jensen appealed the decision of the Juvenile Court to the
Supreme Court and the Supren1e Court, in affirming
the decision of the Juvenile Court, said at page 135:
"Did appellant n1ake such a showing as required the lower court to award him the custody
of his minor daughter~ The writer doubts that
the evidence adduced at the hearing which ·was
adverse to .appellant was .such as to justify a refusal to so order. HoweYer. in Yiew of such testinwny, we cannot say that the court abused its

12
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discretion in requiring appellant to conduct himself 'becomingly' for a period of ten months before
such custody would be given, in view of the previous finding of appellant's unfitnes.s. However,
in reaching such conclusion, we interpret the
court's order to mean that unless during the probationary period appellant so conducts himself
as to indicate an unfitness to have the custody
of hi.s daughter, he shall at the end thereof be
awarded such custody 'so long as said petitioner
maintains a home in a suitable atmosphere to rear
a child of the age and temperament of the child
here in question; upon the failure on the part of
the petitioner, Fern Jensen, the court will again
deprive the petitioner of custody and place the
child elsewhere.'"
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in
the ease of Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 65 P.2d 1049,
reversed an order of the District Court on a habeas
corpus action which permanently deprived a parent of
the custody of his minor children. The facts in the Day
case were as follows: The parents of the minor children
had been divorced about seven years prior to the hearing
and the custody of the minor children awarded to the
mother. Shortly before the hearing the mother died and
the minor children had been placed in the custody of
very close friends of the mother. The father, Frank F.
Day, sought to regain custody of the minor children by
a writ of habeas corpus. The evidence before the trial
court indicated that following the divorce action the
father did not support the minor children, although he
wa.s financially able to do so, that for a period of about
five years he had not seen any of his children and ap13
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parently made no attempt to visit them, nor had he
manifested the slightest concern for their welfare, that
he was an entire stranger to his children and that he
had treated them with utter neglect. The District Court,
after hearing the foregoing evidence, denied the writ
of habeas corpus and entered an order permanently depriving the father of his three children. On appeal to
the Supreme Court it was held that the writ of habeas
corpus was properly denied but that the portion of the
decree which pennanently deprived the father of the
children should be modified. The court at page 1056,
said:
'
"In one particular the decree appealed from
must be modified. By its terms, appellant was deprived permanently of the care, custody, and control of his children. No such provision should have
been included in the decree. What the future
holds, no one can tell. It may be that at some
future time appellant's children, or one or two of
them, should go to him. The court properly made
the children wards of the court. For the pre;sent
at least, they should remain such wards. The
decree appealed from will be 1nodified b~~ eliminating therefrom that portion purporting to permanently dep-rive appellant of the custody of his
children. "
In the case of ill ass v. Vest, 7-± Ida. 328, 262 P. 2d
116, the Idaho Supre1ne Court, on an appeal from an
order denying a writ of habeas corpus sought by a mother
to obtain the custody of a 1ninor child, considered the
lower court's finding of unfitness on the part of the
n10ther and the decree a"·arding the custody of the child
to another couple, who were the respondents in the

14
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matter. In this c.ase the petitioner, the mother of the
child, was married to a man who failed to provide for the
child and who used intoxicating liquors to excess. During
a period of marital difficulties the child was delivered
to the maternal grandmother by the petitioner. The
petitioner then went to San Francisco and while there
she w.as charged with a felony and confined to jail. However, she was permitted to plead guilty to a misdemeanor
and was placed on parole to her mother for one year.
During the time that petitioner was in California, the
maternal grandmother became ill and placed the child
in the home of the respondents with the understanding
that respondents would be permitted to adopt the child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower
court awarding the child to respondents on the ground
that the petitioner was an unfit mother as of the time of
the hearing because of her immoral conduct, but in reg.ard to her opportunity to later regain the custody of
her child, the court said at page 122:
"The basis upon which we affirm the judgment, and the only basis, is that petitioner as of
the time of the hearing was not a fit and proper
person to have custody of her child for the time
being because of her immoral conduct.
"Affirming the judgment awarding custody
to respondents on the ground of moral unfitness
of petitioner does not necessarily me.an that petitioner will be forever precluded from obtaining
custody of her minor son. Such custody may be
restored to her when she has repented and reformed and is otherwise shown to be a fit and
proper person to have the custody. Goldson v.

15
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Goldson, 192 Or. 611, 236 P.2d 314; 17 Am. Jur.,
sec. 684, p. 518 ; 39 An1. J ur ., sees. 25 & 26, pp.
615 & 616."
The weight of authority supports the position that
courts making awards of the cu.stody of children should
give substantial consideration to the fact that it is often
necessary to modify orders affecting custody or even
to make a completely different disposition of the child.
39 Am. Jur., sec. 25, p. 615.
The order permanently depriving appellant of his
children gives no consideration to the rule adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court, as well as by a great majority
of appellate courts, which holds that a parent, whose
child has been taken from him because of his misconduct,
is entitled to have the child restored to him upon proof
that he has reformed and is presently able to provide
.a suitable home for the child. In re Bradley, 109 Utah
538, 167 P. 2d 978; State v. Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132
P.2d 132; Ex Parte Day, 189 \Vash. 368, 65 P.2d 1049;
Moss v. Vest, 74 Ida. 328, :262 P.2d 116; 39 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 25, P. 615.
CONCLUSION
It is appellant's contention that the record before
the Juvenile Court fails to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence, or by any clear and convincing evidence
whatever, that .appellant was not a fit and proper person
to retain the custody of his 1ninor children. \Ye earnestly
contend that there is certainly nothing in the record to
justify the Juvenile Court in 1naking an order per16
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manently depriving him of the custody of his children
and ordering them placed for adoption.
In any event, the record clearly indicates that the
Juvenile Court abu.sed its discretion in not ordering
that the W elf.are Department continue to hold the children under its jurisdiction, and setting a hearing at a
later date in order that appellant's fitness and ability
to provide a proper home for his children could be determined at such time.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed with
instructions to order that the custody of his minor children be granted to .appellant, or in the alternative, that
the matter again be heard by the Juvenile Court to determine appellant's present fitness to be granted the
custody of his minor children.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID S. KUNZ of
PATTERSON & KUNZ,
Attorneys for Appellant
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